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Abstract
Source location privacy (SLP) is becoming an important property for a large
class of security-critical wireless sensor network applications such as monitoring
and tracking. Many routing protocols have been proposed that provide SLP, all
of which provide a trade-off between SLP and energy. Experiments have been
conducted to gauge the performance of the proposed protocols under different
network parameters such as noise levels. As that there exists a plethora of
protocols which contain a set of possibly conflicting performance attributes,
it is difficult to select the SLP protocol that will provide the best trade-offs
across them for a given application with specific requirements. In this paper, we
propose a methodology where SLP protocols are first profiled to capture their
performance under various protocol configurations. Then, we present a novel
decision theoretic procedure for selecting the most appropriate SLP routing
algorithm for the application and network under investigation. We show the
viability of our approach through different case studies.
Keywords: Source Location Privacy, Wireless Sensor Networks, Decision
Theory, Technique Comparison
1. Introduction
A wireless sensor network (WSN) consists of a number of tiny devices, known as
sensor nodes or motes, that can sense different attributes of the environment and
use radio signals to communicate among themselves. WSNs have enabled the de-
velopment of many novel applications, including asset monitoring, target tracking
and environment control [1] among others, with low levels of intrusiveness. They
are also expected to be deployed in safety and security-critical systems, including
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military [2] and medical services. The communication protocols used in the
WSNs must therefore meet a set of stringent security and privacy requirements
dependent on the application.
Threats to privacy in monitoring applications can be considered along two
dimensions: (i) content-based threats and (ii) context-based threats [3]. Content-
based privacy threats relate to use of the content of the messages broadcast by
sensor nodes, such as gaining the ability to read an eavesdropped encrypted
message. There has been much research addressing the issue of providing content
privacy, e.g., SPINS [4], with most efforts in this area focusing on the use of
cryptographic techniques. On the other hand, context-based privacy threats
focus on the context in which messages are broadcast and how information can
be observed or inferred by attackers. Context is a multi-attribute concept that
encompasses situational aspects of broadcast messages, including environmental
and temporal information.
It is often desirable for the source of sensed information to be kept private in a
WSN. For example, in a military application, a soldier transmitting messages can
unintentionally disclose their location, even when encryption is used. Another
example is during the monitoring of endangered species where poachers may be
tempted to infer the location of the animal to capture it. Real world examples
include monitoring badgers [5] and the WWF’s Wildlife Crime Technology
Report [6], both of which would likely benefit from a context-based security
measure. In this paper, the context we focus on protecting is the source location.
Techniques that protect this source location are said to provide source location
privacy (SLP). SLP is important in many application domains, though it is of
utmost concern in security-critical situations. In each of these scenarios, it is
important to ensure that an attacker cannot find or deduce the location of the
asset being monitored, whether it is a soldier or an endangered animal. A WSN
designed to forward the information collected about an asset would typically
consist of the following: a dedicated node for data collection called a sink node,
the node(s) involved in sending information about these assets called source
nodes, and many other nodes in the network used to route/relay messages over
multiple hops from the sources to the sink. It has been shown that even a
weak attacker such as a distributed eavesdropping attacker can backtrack along
message paths through the network to find the source node and capture the
asset [7]. Thus, there is a need to develop SLP-aware algorithms.
A number of techniques have been proposed to provide SLP, such as phantom
routing using random walks [7], delays [8], dummy data sources [9, 10] and many
others [11]. In general, the objective can be informally stated as the provision of
a high level of source location privacy while spending as little energy as possible.
Thus, the various techniques basically navigate this trade-off solution space.
However, when several conflicting objectives are involved, navigating this space
becomes more challenging. Thus, in this paper, we propose a methodology
where routing protocols are first profiled to capture their performance according
to the desired set of metrics. Then, we use a decision theoretic procedure for
selecting the most appropriate SLP routing algorithm for the type of network
and application under study. We show the viability of our approach through
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various case studies and show how the suitability of different SLP protocols vary
according to the application under study.
Thus, the main contributions of this paper are:
• We propose a 2-step methodology for SLP-aware protocol selection: (i)
profiling of protocols and (ii) selection of a protocol.
• The protocol selection step is based on a decision theoretic procedure
that first removes dominated protocols and then formalizes the notion of
relevance using suitable utility functions.
• We show, through the use of various case studies, the impact that the
application has on the suitability of the SLP protocols.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 surveys related
work in SLP and Section 3 presents the models assumed. We present the
relevant routing protocols we consider in this paper in Section 4. In Section 5,
we present the decision theoretic procedure for selecting the most appropriate
SLP-aware routing algorithm. The adopted system and simulation approach are
outlined in Section 6. In Section 7 we present an example of the execution of the
decision theoretic procedure. Section 8 presents three case studies to showcase
the viability of the approach. Section 9 concludes this paper with a summary of
contributions.
2. Related Work
2.1. Overview
The concept of the SLP problem was first posed around 2004 in [12] which
proposed the panda-hunter game where the poachers only used network traffic
flow to track the panda. Kamat formalised the SLP issue based on the panda-
hunter game [7]. Since then, several techniques have been proposed to address
SLP. The solution spectrum spans from simple solutions such as simple random
walk [12] to more sophisticated techniques such as fake sources and diversionary
routing in [10, 13, 14, 15].
2.2. Phantom Walk Technique
In the seminal work [12], the authors proposed a solution called phantom routing,
where messages were sent on a directed random walk where the message was
either sent towards or away from a certain node in the network, followed by using
the flooding routing protocol. A similar approach to phantom routing was used
in [7]. Instead of using flooding, they used single path routing protocols, such
as shortest path routing. The combination of the random walk together with
such single path routing is often referred to as the phantom single-path routing
scheme (PSRS). Phantom routing and PSRS has received a lot of attention in
literature. On the other hand, this class of solution is known to have weaknesses
as demonstrated by [16, 17, 18], ascribing poor SLP performance to the directed
random walk reusing the routing path and exposure of direction information.
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For other random walk algorithms, an improvement of the directed random
walk was introduced in [19], with the introduction of the self-adjusting directed
random walk (SADRW). The neighbours were divided into four different sets,
and nodes randomly pick a neighbour out of one of the four directional sets and
send the messages to it. A new algorithm using location angles was proposed
to construct the random walk based on the inclination angle between a node
and its neighbour towards the sink [20]. The author Xi introduced the greedy
random walk (GROW) [21]. In GROW, one random walk starts from the sink
and goes to a randomly chosen receptor-node. The other random walk starts
from the source and meets the first random walk at the receptor-node. Then,
the receptor-node uses the path established by the random walk from the sink
to the receptor-node to route the packet from the source to the sink. Besides,
the authors used a different approach, by recording neighbours in a bloom filter
which informed the choice of the next node to be used in the random walk [21].
However, there is still scope to improve the nodes that are allocated to take part
in the directed random walk. Other algorithms use the random walk technique to
address the SLP issue such as randomly selected intermediary node (RRIN) [22],
random routing scheme (RRS) [23] and phantom walkabouts [24].
2.3. Fake Source Technique
Algorithms utilise dummy messages sent by a fake source to provide SLP. Some
nodes are chosen as fake sources and periodically send dummy messages to
obfuscate the real traffic. In the early stages, the author Ozturk introduced a
concept of fake sources and propose a theoretical algorithm called short-lived fake
source routing (SLFSR) [12]. Later on, many algorithms have been proposed with
state-of-the-art fake message techniques [10, 25, 26, 27, 28]. These algorithms
based on the fake source mentioned so far can only provide SLP against the
local attacker.
For the scope of the global attacker, a global protection scheme called Periodic
was developed in which every node sends a message after a fixed period [29].
This provided perfect protection against an attacker with a global view of the
network. The authors created a model involving traces of source detection, which
was used to measure the privacy of those traces as well as the energy cost of
providing SLP. In addition, a different approach where statistical techniques
were used to show that their global protection scheme provided high levels of
SLP [14]. This approach did not provide perfect global SLP as [29] did, but
instead provided statistically strong SLP. Their model and solution aimed to
make the distribution of message broadcasts from nodes indistinguishable from
a certain statistical distribution.
Other techniques consist of a hybrid between generating fake messages and
having messages modify their routing path. Tree-based diversionary routing [15]
which imposes a tree structure on the network and then routes fake messages
through the tree. Similarly, fog or cloud techniques [30, 31] have been proposed
to provide SLP where a normal message is routed through a group of nodes
called a fog and then onwards to other fogs.
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Perhaps the most significant disadvantage of the described fake source tech-
niques is the volume of messages broadcast to provide SLP. This leads to
increased energy consumption and an increased number of collisions, both of
which result in a decreased packet delivery ratio. This means that a tradeoff
between energy expenditure and privacy must be made [26], making dummy
message schemes challenging for many large-scale networks.
2.4. Other Techniques
Apart from techniques described above, an algorithm was proposed where nodes
changed the chronological order of received messages and sent messages which
also change the traffic pattern, making it hard for a local adversary to track
the traffic to the source node [8]. Wang used separate path routing to transmit
messages, leading to less packets per path, making it harder for the adversary
to track messages back to the real source [16]. Mules-saving-source protocol
(MussP) use α-angle anonymity to provide SLP by adopting data mules which
collect the packets from sources and drop them elsewhere [32]. Others include
using geographic routing [17] and network coding [33, 34] to address the SLP
issue.
3. Models
In this section, we present the various models that underpin this work.
3.1. Network Model
We assume a wireless sensor network to contain a set of resource-constrained
nodes that communicate among themselves using radio. When a node senses the
environment, it generates a message and sends the message towards a dedicated
node called the sink. There are several potential routing algorithms for WSNs.
We assume all the nodes to be static, i.e., the topology of the network remains
constant as well as the neighbourhoods of all the nodes over the lifetime of the
network. We do not assume that links are bidirectional, i.e., links may disappear
intermittently.
3.2. Attacker Model
We assume a patient adversary model, known as a distributed eavesdropper,
introduced in [7]. The attacker initially starts at the sink and we assume the
attacker is equipped with the necessary devices to determine the direction a
message originated (such as directional antennas). When the attacker overhears
a new message, they will move to the location of the immediate sender, i.e.,
the neighbour that last forwarded the message. This is commensurate with the
attacker model used in [10, 26, 27, 35, 36].
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4. Routing Protocols Review
In this section, we will review the SLP-aware routing protocols that will be
analysed in this paper. However, the framework we propose can be extended to
handle any other SLP-aware routing protocol.
4.1. Protectionless Flooding and Protectionless CTP
Two routing algorithms that provide no SLP will be evaluated in this work to
compare against the SLP techniques. The first is flooding in which a source
floods a message through the network, by having each node that receives it
forwarding it. Flooding is included as it was shown by the seminal work to
provide no SLP [7]. The second is CTP [37] (the Collection Tree Protocol) which
uses the expected number of transmissions to gauge the reliability of a link to
form a routing tree from every node in the network to the sink. CTP is included
as it is the state-of-the-art reliable routing protocol for WSNs. No work thus far
has analysed its ability to provide SLP.
4.2. Phantom Walkabouts
Phantom walkabouts is an algorithm using a random walk technique to provide
SLP [24]. The new technique, which uses a mix of short and long random
walks, achieves a higher level of SLP than phantom routing with a bounded
message overhead. Authors denote a phantom walkabouts parameterisation by
PW (ms,ml), where ms and ml denote the number of short and long random
walks respectively to be performed in a cycle. When a source node routes a
message M using phantom walkabouts, a decision is needed regarding whether
M goes on a short or long random route. The sequencing of messages is as
follows:
Ms, · · · ,Ms,︸ ︷︷ ︸
ms
Ml, · · · ,Ml,︸ ︷︷ ︸
ml
Ms, · · · ,Ms,︸ ︷︷ ︸
ms
Ml, · · · ,Ml,︸ ︷︷ ︸
ml
· · ·
For instance, PW (1, 1) denotes a repeating sequence of 1 short random walk
followed by 1 long random walk. Therefore, we observe that phantom walkabouts
consists of ms messages on short random walk Ms and ml messages on long
random walk Ml, before the cycle is repeated.
4.3. DynamicSPR
DynamicSPR is an extended version of the Dynamic fake source technique [27].
In Dynamic, fake sources are allocated away from the real source and sink in
order to provide a pull in that direction. The technique dynamically determines
parameters online to be able to adjust to a changing network environment.
DynamicSPR [38] optimises the way fake sources are allocated, such that the
fake sources perform a directed random walk away from the sink. This reduces
the number of fake sources present in the network and also the number of
messages the technique sent (thus reducing the energy usage).
6
4.4. ILP Routing
In ILP Routing [39], the problem of SLP-aware routing of messages from a source
to a sink was modelled as an Integer Linear Programming (ILP) optimisation
problem. Using an ILP solver an optimal solution was obtained when trying
to maximise the attacker’s distance from the source. As the optimal solution
required global knowledge, the authors implemented a distributed version that
had a message take a directed walk around the sink to approach it from a
direction other than the one the source was in. Messages were delayed by
different amounts such that they reached a similar point at a certain distance.
By doing this the attacker makes less progress, due to messages being grouped
at a similar location and also because messages would be missed that take a
different path.
5. Decision Theoretic Procedure for Selecting Routing Algorithm
Given the number of SLP-aware routing protocols, each one optimizing one or
more attributes, it becomes challenging to select a protocol for a given application.
For example, if an application requires a high level of privacy and is supposed to
run for a short time, selecting a protocol that trades-off privacy for lower energy
consumption will not be suitable. Thus, there is a need to develop a framework
that can guide a network or application designer in selecting the appropriate
SLP-aware routing protocol.
In this section, we are thus concerned about structuring the preferences
to simplify the trade-off analysis. As we are concerned about multi-attribute
optimization, we provide a brief overview of the theory underpinning generation
of multi-attribute utility functions. Table 1 summarises the most commonly
used symbols in the paper.
5.1. Brief Introduction to Decision Theory (DT)
We refer the readers to [40, 41] for details about multi-objective optimization.
Very often, real-world cases deal with more than three attributes. We assume
that we have n evaluators, E1, E2, . . . En, evaluating attributes a1, a2, . . . an
respectively, such that (E1(a1), E2(a2), . . . En(an)) = (q1, q2, . . . , qn), where each
qi captures the “performance” of the protocol for a particular attribute and
the vector (q1, q2, . . . , qn) is the “performance” vector of a protocol. An overall
relevance function, G, may be expressed in additive form
G(q1, q2, . . . , qn) =
n∑
i=1
(λi ∗Gi(qi)) (1)
where Gi’s are single-attribute or individual relevance functions [40, 41], and∑n
i=1 λi = 1 iff the attributes are mutually preferentially independent, i.e., trade-
off between pairs of attributes is independent of the values of other attributes.
Such a property is important to keep the selection “local”, i.e., the trade-offs
between a pair of attributes need not consider the values of all other attributes.
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Table 1: Commonly used symbols
Symbol Description
c Network configuration
P Name of a given protocol
rc,Pω Result of a attribute under c and P
Rc,Pω Normalised Result of a attribute under c and P
rc,P Result vector of all attributes under c and P
Rc,P Performance vector of all attributes under c and P
U c,Pω Utility of a single attribute under c and P
U c,P Utility of performance vector under c and P
ua Aspiration vector
λω The weight of a single attribute
∆ss Distance between sink node and source node
tt Flooding time taken
sp Safety period
A higher value of λi is indicative of a higher importance of the corresponding
attribute. Thus, to generate the overall relevance function, each λi needs to
be determined, subject to the constraint
∑n
i=1 λi = 1. Also, each individual
relevance function Gi needs to be generated by the system administrator or
application developer. Determining an accurate Gi is a challenging process. We
direct the interested reader to [40, 41] for more information about generating
such functions, which is however beyond the objective of the paper. We will use
arbitrary functions to showcase the decision theoretic methodology we propose
in the paper.
5.2. Decision Theory-Based Heuristic
In this section, we present a novel two-step decision procedure (or heuristic)
that helps choose the most suitable SLP-aware routing algorithm from a set of
contenders for a given application:
Step 1 - Profiling and Filtering
1. For various network configurations (size, safety factor, noise models etc),
run all the protocols to obtain their respective performance profiles, i.e.,
generate their performance vectors. This step can be done once and the
profiles stored in a database or library.
2. Determine all decision attributes for the application, e.g., latency, delivery
ratio or capture ratio. If the attributes are not mutually preferentially inde-
pendent, then either transform them so that they can satisfy this property.
Otherwise, more sophisticated techniques are required. Also, determine
the network configuration which the application will be running under.
This is called the input network configuration (or input configuration). If
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there is no profile associated with the input configuration, then either the
protocol has to be run under this new configuration (and added to the
library) or a profile exists in the library for a configuration that is close
enough to the input configuration.
3. For a given input network configuration, determine a vector that best
represents the application’s requirements, i.e, determine a vector that
captures the acceptable value boundary for each attribute. The boundary
is the maximal or minimal acceptable value, depending on the attribute
type. We refer to this vector as the aspiration vector.
4. For the given input network configuration, remove all vectors that are
either dominated by the aspiration vector (i.e., all entries in the aspiration
vector are better than the corresponding ones in the vector under consider-
ation), since they fall short of the application’s requirements for the input
configuration.
5. If there are no candidates left, go to 3. Else, for each attribute, determine
the minimum and maximum values from the remaining alternatives. This
is done to help in determining normalized single-attribute functions (range
from 0 to 1).
Step 2 - Characterization and Selection
1. Determine the (i) individual weights (or importance) of each attribute, (ii)
individual relevance function and (iii) the overall relevance function.
2. For each algorithm (i.e., performance vector) in the set of remaining
contenders, insert the attribute values in the overall relevance function to
obtain their respective relevance or utility values.
3. Select the alternative with the highest relevance value.
We now explain the steps in more detail.
5.3. Step 1: Profiling and Filtering SLP-Aware Routing Algorithms
5.3.1. Profiling the Protocols
In the first phase of Step 1, we run every protocol under consideration under
various network configurations. These profiles (or protocol performance vectors)
can then be saved or stored in a protocol library that can be used whenever a new
application is developed. This step need not be repeated for every application,
but is a one-time activity. If a new protocol is developed, then the process is
repeated for the new protocol, and its (normalized) performance profile is added
to the library.
5.3.2. Determining Decision Attributes
We determine four decision attributes that could be classified into gain type
(high value is better, e.g., delivery ratio) and cost type (high value is worse, e.g.,
capture ratio). Decision Attributes can differ depending on the applications:
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• Capture Ratio (cr) is defined as the number of experiments ending in
a capture of attacker in the safety period divided by the total number
of experiment repeats for a specific parameter combination. The lower
capture ratio is, the higher the source location privacy.
• Delivery Ratio (dr) is defined as the average percentage of messages send
by the source that arrive at the sink across multiple simulation repeats.
• Message Latency (lat) is the average amount of time it takes a message to
travel from the source to the sink.
• Message Transmission (msg) is the average number of messages transmit-
ted through each node per second in the network. The attribute approxi-
mates the energy cost as sending and receiving are expensive activities in
WSNs [1].
For a given network configuration c and given protocol P, the result vector
rc,P can be determined experimentally (e.g., through simulations). The vector
contains the recorded (raw) values of all decision attributes.
rc,P = (rc,Pcr , r
c,P
dr , r
c,P
lat , r
c,P
msg) (2)
Please note that, since our focus in this paper has been for SLP-awareness,
the attributes of interest capture both SLP levels and WSNs performance (e.g.,
capture ratio, delivery ratio) and these are used in the vector. However, we
conjecture that a similar heuristic can be used but for different objectives,
requiring a different set of attributes.
An example of a result vector for an arbitrary SLP-aware protocol P ′ for an
input configuration c′, using the above attributes, could be:
rc
′,P ′ = (10%, 90%, 2500, 12800) (3)
However, these attributes do not satisfy the mutually preferentially indepen-
dent property. This is apparent as, for example, the capture ratio attribute is
dependent on the delivery ratio attribute. For example, a low delivery ratio will
imply a low capture ratio because the attacker will have overheard only a few
messages and would not have been able to track the asset down. In a similar
way, message transmission attribute is related to the delivery ratio in that, if a
node does not receive a normal (data) message, then it is not going to forward
it, reducing the number of message transmissions.
To address this issue, we opt to transform some of these attributes to attempt
to introduce the mutual preferential independence property. Since delivery
ratio is the one attribute that seems to affect both capture ratio and message
transmissions, we normalize these two attributes with respect to delivery ratio,
i.e., we penalize these attributes with respect to the delivery ratio. On the other
hand, latency is independent of delivery ratio. Thus, we redefine the attributes
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as follows:
Rc,Pω =
rc,Pω /rc,Pdr if ω ∈ {cr,msg},rc,Pω otherwise. (4)
5.3.3. Determining Aspiration Vector
With consideration of different scenarios, we choose the aspiration value for each
attribute to remove any results not in the scope to meet the scenario requirement.
The aspiration value defines the minimal (or maximal in the case of cost criterion)
acceptable value for each attribute. We will denote the aspiration vector by µa.
5.3.4. Filtering the Protocols
Based on the performances of the various protocols, it is obvious that those
protocols that are worse (in all attributes) than all other protocols can be
removed from the list as it implies that such protocols will never get selected as
there is always another protocol that can deliver better result. In our case, based
on the selection of protocols that we have chosen, none of them is dominated and
thus none of them gets removed from the list. For example, ILP Routing-Max
has very low capture ratio but has very high latency as its mechanism is based
on using time redundancy to achieve privacy.
5.3.5. Checking Remaining Values
For each attribute, we check whether any results are left in the scope of the
aspiration value. If not, return to phase 3 and reselect the aspiration value as
all remaining results do not satisfy the aspiration value.
5.4. Step 2: Characterization and Selection of SLP-Aware Routing Algorithms
5.4.1. Determining Weights and Utility Functions
In the first phase of step 2, we choose individual weight λω (ω ∈ {cr, dr, lat,msg})
which represents the importance of attributes. From step 1, having the aspiration
vector, we use it to generate the utility function for each attribute. The total
utility obtained by some algorithm is shown below, where U c,Pω is single attribute
utility and Rc,Pω is a result value in R
c,P .
U c,P(λω, Rc,Pω ) =
∑
λω · U c,Pω (Rc,Pω ) (5)
5.4.2. Inserting Attribute Values
In the second phase of step 2, for each attribute, we use utility functions and
the remaining normalised result vector (i.e., performance vector) in the library
as input to calculate the utility value. Then the final utility of algorithm under
c can be calculated by Equation 5.
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5.4.3. Selecting Utility Value
After proceeding above, we have obtained utility values of all algorithms and
have choosen the best algorithm in terms of the highest utility value. In this
case, we claim that under network configuration c and the given scenario, the
algorithm with the highest utility value has the best performance.
6. Experimental Setup
In this section, we describe the simulation setup, parameters setup and safety
period calculation that were used to generate the results (i.e., performance
library), presented in Section 8.
6.1. Simulation Setup
The TOSSIM (V2.1.2) simulation environment was used in all experiments [42].
TOSSIM is a discrete event simulator capable of accurately modelling sensor
nodes and the modes of communications between them. An experiment is made
of a single execution of the simulation environment using a specified protocol
configuration, network nodes and safety period. An experiment terminated when
any source node had been captured by an attacker during the safety period or
the safety period had expired.1
6.2. Parameters Setup
A square grid network layout of size n × n was used in all experiments, with
n ∈ {11, 21}, i.e., networks with 121 and 441 nodes respectively. Source node
generated messages and a single sink node collected messages. These nodes were
assigned positions in the SourceCorner configuration from [10] where the source
is in the corner and sink at the center of the grid. The rate at which messages
from the real sources was generated was set to be 1 message per second. Nodes
were placed 4.5 meters apart. At least 2000 repeats were performed for each
combination of source location and parameters.
The node neighbourhoods were generated using two types of radio models.
The first is ideal, which is a unit disk graph radio model (UDGM) where a
perfectly reliable network link exists between the edges of a node’s neighbours
that are 4.5 meters away. The second is low-asymmetry, which uses the LinkLay-
erModel tool provided with TOSSIM to generate link strengths between nodes
using the parameters shown in Table 3. Links generated with low-asymmetry
have a small probability of becoming asynchronous.
The noise model was created using the first 2500 lines of casino-lab.txt and
meyer-heavy.txt2. All the nodes are stationary (i.e., they do not move in the
network).
1The source code for the algorithms tested and the scripts to run the experiments are
available at https://bitbucket.org/Chen_Gu/slp-algorithms-tinyos.
2casino-lab.txt and meyer-heavy.txt are noise sample files provided with TOSSIM.
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Number casino-lab casino-lab meyer-heavy
of Nodes ideal low-asymmetry low-asymmetry
121 12.64 9.87 22.89
441 25.42 20.06 46.84
Table 2: Time Taken for each network size
when one message is sent per second.
Name Value
PATH LOSS EXPONENT 4.7
SHADOWING STANDARD DEVIATION 3.2
D0 1.0
PL D0 55.4
NOISE FLOOR -105
S [0.9 -0.7; -0.7 1.2]
WHITE GAUSSIAN NOISE 4
Table 3: LinkLayerModel Parameters for the
low-asymmetry radio model
6.2.1. Phantom Routing and Phantom Walkabouts
These two algorithms both rely on the random walk technique. When choos-
ing the length of the short and long random walks, a variety of parameter
combinations were considered. Our experiments set the short random walk
series S = {2, 3, . . . , 0.5×∆ss}, and long random walk series L = {2 + ∆ss, 3 +
∆ss, . . . , 1.5 × ∆ss}, where ∆ss is the sink source distance. In the phantom
walkabouts, the short and long random walk length are randomly generated
from S and L respectively. For phantom routing, we fix random walk length to
be 0.5×∆ss hops.
6.2.2. DynamicSPR
For this technique, as it aims to dynamically determine the parameters to
use online, there are few parameters to specify. Other than the previously
mentioned parameters, only the approach used needs to be specified. The
approach determines how many fake messages are sent over the lifetime of
a temporary fake source. There are three options: Fixed1, Fixed2 and Rnd.
Fixed1 sends a single fake message over the duration, Fixed2 sends two fake
messages over the duration and Rnd sends either 1 or 2 messages randomly
chosen.
6.2.3. ILP Routing
This algorithm has four parameters: the maximum walk length, the buffer size,
the number of messages to group and the probability the message is sent directly
to the sink. We use the same parameters as used in [39]. As the maximum walk
length is simply to provide a finite bound in large networks, it was set to 100
hops. The number of messages to group was varied between {1, 2, 3, 4}. The
buffer size was set to 10 messages as we do not expect more than 10 concurrent
messages being sent in the network at one time. Finally, the probability of
sending a message directly to the sink was set to 20% as it was identified as a
good setting in the paper.
6.2.4. Protectionless Routing
We use two protectionless routing algorithms, namely flooding and Collection
Tree Protocol (CTP). Flooding has been shown to provide no source location
privacy. On the other hand, CTP is a convergecast type of protocol that collects
data to be sent to the sink. Even though CTP keeps track of network information
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such as neighborhood information, to keep the routing reliable, the attacker
cannot make use of this information as the relevance is only local. On the other
hand, capturing a source required global information about the network.
6.3. Safety Period
A metric called the safety period (which we call time-to-capture from this point)
was introduced in [7] which is the number of messages sent that an attacker needs
to capture the source. The higher the time-to-capture is, the higher the source
location privacy level. Using the time-to-capture metric means that simulation
runtime is unbounded and potentially very large.
We thus use an alternative, but analogous, definition for safety period for
each network size and network topology, we obtain the time-to-capture when
protectionless flooding is used as the routing protocol. Flooding is used as it
has been argued to provide the least SLP level, hence any SLP improvement
is due to the SLP-aware technique [7]. The safety period is then obtained
by increasing this value to account for the attacker potentially making bad
moves. This definition is commensurate with [10, 26, 27, 35], but uses a different
multiplicative factor due to the difference in the type of SLP technique being
used.
Intuitively, the safety period captures the time period during which the asset
will be at the same location. We calculate different safety periods sp as the
following, where tt is the time-to-capture for protectionless flooding and ψ is the
safety factor.
sp = ψ × tt ψ ∈ {0.4, 0.8, 1.2, . . . , 2.8} (6)
The time taken tt for each network size and network topology, for protection-
less flooding is shown in table Table 2.
7. Example Execution of Decision Theoretic Procedure
In this section, we provide a brief example of the execution of the decision
theoretic procedures we proposed during the profiling and filtering phase (Sub-
section 5.3) and the selection phase (Subsection 5.4).
Figure 1 is an example containing the results of the capture ratio, delivery
ratio, latency and message transmission for the various protocols under consid-
eration, with network configuration c = (grid, 121, SourceCorner, CasinoLab,
LowAsymmetry, 1.2) which specifies that the network is a grid network of 121
nodes (i.e., 11*11), SourceCorner topology (the source is at one corner of the
grid), Casino Lab noise model, Low Asymmetry communication model and
1.2 × tt safety period respectively. From Table 2, we can calculate that the
actual safety period is 11.84 seconds. For simplicity, we only evaluate the overall
utility of phantom routing and PW (1, 1) for comparison for such a network
configuration.
7.1. Step 1: Profiling and Filtering SLP-Aware Routing Algorithms
We now explain step 1 of the decision theoretic procedure.
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Figure 1: Example: Multiple Algorithm Results
7.1.1. Profiling the Protocols
We execute a number of routing protocols, as explained in Section 6, some
SLP-aware and others not. Figure 1 shows the graphs of capture ratio, delivery
ratio, latency and message transmission.
Under configuration c (as above), the result vector of phantom routing is (0.25,
0.65, 0.05, 100), with 25% capture ratio, 65% delivery ratio, 50 ms for latency and
100 messages for message transmission. Similarly, the result vector of PW (1, 1)
is (0.1, 0.6, 0.06, 75). As discussed in Subsubsection 5.3.2, results of attributes in
the vector are not mutually preferentially independent, so need to be normalised
in this case. The normalised results are shown in Figure 2. We calculate the
normalised result vector of phantom routing, and is (0.38, 0.65, 0.05, 153.85),
while the normalised result vector of PW (1, 1) is (0.17, 0.6, 0.06, 125). We use
the normalised result vectors, or performance vectors, to form the protocol
performance library, from which the most suitable SLP-aware protocol is to
be selected. Since the objective here is to show the execution of our decision
theoretic procedure, we focused on phantom routing and PW(1,1) as routing
protocols.
7.1.2. Determining Decision Attributes
The four attributes we are interested in are: (i) capture ratio, (ii) delivery
ratio, (iii) latency and (iv) message transmission or overhead. In general, for
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Figure 2: Example: Multiple Algorithm Results of Normalised Capture Ratio and Message
Transmission
SLP, capture ratio and message or energy overhead are the two most important
overhead. However, there are applications when other parameters such as delivery
ratio is important. In this paper, for the applications we consider, the above
four attributes are considered relevant.
7.1.3. Determining Aspiration Vector
We now determine the aspiration value for each attribute. For instance, if 50%
is given as a aspiration value for capture ratio and 60% for delivery ratio, the
utility of capture ratio and delivery ratio will be set to 0 at these values. The
system designer may consider that SLP cannot be provided if the capture ratio
is greater than 50% and that the routing of protocol cannot work properly if
the delivery ratio is lower than 60%. In this example, the aspiration vector is
set to (0.5, 0.5, 0.1, 250). This means that the normalized capture ratio is set to
50%, the delivery ratio is set to 50%, latency is set at 100 ms and the message
overhead at 250.
7.1.4. Filtering the Protocols
Having the normalized results of both phantom routing and PW (1, 1), we first
determine whether these two results are dominated by each other. If one protocol
dominates the other, then there is a clear winner and the dominating protocol is
selected as the best one. From our performance library, we observe that only
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the capture ratio and message transmission of PW (1, 1) perform better than
phantom routing. Hence, we conclude that PW(1,1) does not dominate phantom
routing and vice-versa. Therefore, in this case, we retain both for consideration.
7.1.5. Checking Remaining Values
Since neither PW(1,1) nor phantom routing dominate each other, we need to
determine whether they are dominated by the aspiration vector. The aspiration
vector is (0.5, 0.5, 0.1, 250) while the performance profiles of phantom routing
and PW(1,1) is (0.38, 0.65, 0.05, 153.85) and (0.17, 0.6, 0.06, 125) respectively. As
can be observed, the aspiration vector does not dominate either of the protocols,
hence both protocols are still under consideration.
7.2. Step 2: Characterization and Selection of algorithms
Since there is more than a single protocol still in contention, i.e., there is no
clear winner, we now detail Step 2 to select the better protocol.
7.2.1. Determining Weights and Utility Functions
Based on the aspiration vector, we use sigmoid functions to build the utility
functions for attributes3. We choose the parameters and generate the utility
functions for the four attributes, as shown in Equation 7 to Equation 10. For
simplicity, we adopt a weight vector with equal values λ = (0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25),
meaning that all four attributes are equally as important.
U c,Pcr (R
c,P
cr ) =
1
1 + e10(R
c,P
cr −0.5)
(7)
U c,Pdr (R
c,P
dr ) =
1
1 + e10(−R
c,P
dr +0.5)
(8)
U c,Plat (R
c,P
lat ) =
1
1 + e2(R
c,P
lat −1.5)
(9)
U c,Pmsg(R
c,P
msg) =
1
1 + e0.005(R
c,P
msg−1000)
(10)
7.2.2. Inserting Attribute Values
Using the utility functions identified (Equation 7 to Equation 10), we can calculate
the utility value of each attribute in phantom routing: U c,Pcr (0.38) = 0.76,
U c,Pdr (0.65) = 0.82, U
c,P
lat (0.05) = 0.95 and U
c,P
msg(153.85) = 0.99. Finally, using
the identified weight vector λ, the final utility of protocol P phantom routing
under c is:
U c,P(λω, Rc,Pω ) =
∑
λω · U c,Pω (Rc,Pω )
= 0.25× 0.76 + 0.25× 0.82 + 0.25× 0.95 + 0.25× 0.99
= 0.88
(11)
3Other utility functions could be also applied and we will show this in later sections.
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Similarly, the utility value of PW (1, 1) also can be calculated: U c,Pcr (0.17) =
0.96, U c,Pdr (0.6) = 0.73, U
c,P
lat (0.06) = 0.95 and U
c,P
msg(125) = 0.99. The final
utility is 0.91.
7.2.3. Selecting Utility Value
Comparing the final utility of phantom routing and PW (1, 1), we select PW (1, 1)
as the better algorithm to provide SLP under a network configuration c and
with weight λ, as it is the one with the highest utility value.
8. Case Studies: Routing Protocol Selection for Different Application
Scenarios
In this section, we will develop three case studies to showcase both the appli-
cability of, and the generality allowed by, our methodology. The three case
studies we present are : (i) an animal protection scenario, (ii) a non-critical asset
monitoring scenario and (iii) a security-critical military scenario.4
In the first phase, we reuse the library that has already been built, that
consists of a number of protocols that have been profiled. We denote the library
by L and the protocols are listed in Table 4. Next, we identified the set of
decision attributes to consist of (i) capture ratio, (ii) delivery ratio, (iii) latency
and (iv) message overhead.
In the next step, rather than deciding on the input network configuration,
we will eschew this step so as to keep the discussion as general as possible. We
also have the following aspiration vector:
µa = (min{Rc,Pcr | P ∈ L},max{Rc,Pdr | P ∈ L},min{Rc,Plat | P ∈ L},min{Rc,Pmsg | P ∈ L}) (12)
Thus, this means that all protocols are in contention and will be under
consideration, i.e., there is no filtering of protocols at this time.
The first phase of Step 2 is to decide the importance of each of the attributes
(from capture ratio, delivery ratio, latency and message transmission) and to
create a vector of weights quantifying the preference of each metric. Utilising
the data and methods presented in Subsection 5.3, it is possible to calculate
the utility of each protocol-parameter combination and generate plots to show
which combination provides the highest utility for the given scenario. Specifically,
using an input network configuration c, it is possible to then select the most
appropriate protocol.
For attributes, we use both non-linear5 and linear functions6 to model the
utility of each parameter, as shown in Table 5. For those important attributes,
non-linear functions are used to satisfy the quick change rate of utility while
linear functions are used for smooth change rate. Parameters for the different
attribute utility functions in different scenarios are shown in Table 6.
4The dataset used to generated these results can be found at [43].
5We use sigmoid function with formula f(x) = 1
1+ek(−x−x0)
6The formula is f(x) = kx + x0
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For all case studies, the network is assumed to be a grid with the source
node assumed to be at the top-left corner (i.e., a SourceCorner configuration).
Note that these need not be the case and there is no constraint imposed by the
approach that precludes certain types of networks.
Algorithm Name Technique SLP-aware?
Protectionless Flooding No
Protectionless CTP Collection Tree Protocol No
DynamicSPR Fake Messages Yes
ILP Routing Directed Walk Yes
Phantom Routing Directed Random Walk Yes
Phantom Walkabouts Directed Random Walk Yes
Table 4: Algorithms Library (L)
Attribute
Function Model Types
Animal Protection Asset Monitor Military
Normalised Capture Ratio Non-Linear Linear Non-Linear
Delivery Ratio (%) Linear Non-Linear Non-Linear
Latency (sec) Linear Linear Non-Linear
Normalised Message Transmission Linear Non-Linear Linear
Table 5: Function Model Types
Attribute
Scenario
Animal Protection Asset Monitoring Military
k x0 weight k x0 weight k x0 weight
Normalised Capture Ratio 50.0 0.1 0.4 -1.0 1.0 0.2 50.0 0.1 0.4
Delivery Ratio (%) 1.0 0.0 0.2 20.0 -0.8 0.4 20.0 -0.8 0.25
Latency (sec) -0.5 1.0 0.2 -0.5 1.0 0.1 10.0 0.5 0.25
Normalised Message Transmission -0.0005 1.0 0.2 0.01 400 0.3 -0.0005 1.0 0.1
Table 6: Parameters for Attribute Utility Functions in Different Scenarios
8.1. Animal Protection Scenario
In this scenario, to prevent the rare animal from being captured by a poacher,
SLP is crucial. Badgers protection [5] and the WWF’s Wildlife Crime Technology
Report [6] are real world examples of animal protection. Therefore, capture ratio
is the most important attribute. To maximise network lifetime, the message
overhead needs to be reduced while delivery ratio needs to be high as well to
better understand the animal’s behaviour. Thus, we set the weighting vector to
be λ = (0.4, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2). We then use these weights and the respective utility
values (for each attribute, see Tables 5 and 6) to produce the overall utility plots,
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Figure 3: Utility of Animal Protection Scenario
allowing us to deliberate on which protocol and parameter combination would
be most suited for the application. Figure 3 shows the overall utility values
generated using the weights and utility functions previously specified7.
Protocol Selection: From the utility values, the input network configuration
is required. For example, if the animal is expected to trigger a node that is at the
top-left corner of a grid network of 11*11 that has been deployed and that the
animal is expected to be constantly on the move (i.e., spend only a short time
at a given location), and the environment is expected to be lightly noisy (i.e.,
7For simplicity, each configuration was described under corresponding graph with such
format: number of nodes/noise model/communication model
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similar to the Casino Lab noise model) and the links are expected to be often
unidirectional, then the input configuration can be as follows: c = (grid, 121,
SourceCorner, CasinoLab, LowAsymmetry, 1.2). Then, this configuration will
correspond to Figure 3c and the best protocol is AdaptiveSPR that AdaptiveSPR-
Min and AdaptiveSPR-max provide near-comparable performance. On the other
hand, for example, if the input configuration is c = (grid, 441, SourceCorner,
CasinoLab, Ideal, 1.2), then the protocols that achieve the best trade-offs are
PW(1,1) and PW(1,2) (see Figure 3b).
8.2. Asset Monitoring Scenario
Sensors are often deployed in the body of bridges or in a building to monitor
product quality [2]. They can also be deployed to monitor and understand animal
behaviour (e.g., Great Duck Island [1]), differently from animal protection, as
explained in the previous section. For this type of application, it could be
assumed that delivery ratio is the most important factor. This would leave
capture ratio, latency and message transmission to be less important. Assume
the weighting vector λ = (0.2, 0.4, 0.1, 0.3) respectively representing capture
ratio, delivery ratio, latency and message transmission.
Protocol Selection: From the utility values, the input network configuration
is required. For example, if the animal is expected to trigger a node that is at
the top-left corner of a grid network of 11*11 that has been deployed. Since the
animal is not expected to be very mobile and the environment can be expected
to be noisy (i.e., similar to the Meyer Heavy noise model) with unidirectional
links due to a lack of line-of-sight transmission, then the input configuration can
be as follows: c = (grid, 121, SourceCorner, MeyerHeavy, LowAsymmetry, 2).
Then, this configuration will correspond to Figure 4e and the best protocol is
Protectionless CTP.
On the other hand, if the environment is not very noisy, i.e., similar to
the Casino Lab noise model, then with a network configuration c = (grid, 121,
SourceCorner, CasinoLab, LowAsymmetry, 2), ILP Routing is the protocol that
achieves the best trade-off Figure 4c.
8.3. Military Scenario
The use of sensor networks in military situations includes communication, battle-
field surveillance and battle damage assessment among many others [2]. When
these activities are carried out by military personnel, then SLP is extremely
important. Further, these networks may be short-lived, thus message overhead is
not very important. On the other hand, latency and delivery ratio are important,
though less than SLP, to ensure soldiers can communicate in near real-time.
Thus, the weight vector is λ = (0.4, 0.25, 0.25, 0.1).
Protocol Selection: From the utility values, the input network configuration
is required. For example, we assume that the surveillance activity to be carried
out is expected to trigger a node that is at the top-left corner of a grid network
of 11*11 that has been deployed. Since the personnel is expected to be very
mobile and the environment can be expected to be noisy (i.e., similar to the
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Figure 4: Utility of Asset Monitoring Scenario
MeyerHeavy noise model) with unidirectional links due to a lack of line-of-sight
transmission, then the input configuration can be as follows: c = (grid, 121,
SourceCorner, MeyerHeavy, LowAsymmetry, 1.2). Then, this configuration will
correspond to Figure 5e and the best protocol is AdaptiveSPR.
On the other hand, if the environment is not very noisy, i.e., similar to
the Casino Lab noise model, then with a network configuration c = (grid,441,
SourceCorner, CasinoLab, LowAsymmetry, 1.2), AdaptiveSPR is the protocol
that achieves the best trade-off in Figure 5d.
In the ideal environment, apart from ILP Routing, other protocols are
good choices. However, when the environment gets worse, Protectionless and
ProtectionlessCTP generally become the protocols of choice.
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Figure 5: Utility of Military Scenario
9. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we propose a decision theoretic procedure for selecting the SLP-
aware routing algorithm that achieves the best trade-offs among a set of attributes.
The methodology is based on the existence of a library of performance profiles
of the various routing algorithms and the decision theoretic procedure allows
trade-offs to be assessed. This can be achieved when the attributes are mutually
preferentially independent. The utility functions, the weights of the attributes
and the network configurations are inputs that have to be provided by network
administrators. We have presented three case studies to showcase the viability
of the approach.
As future work, there are a few additions we plan on doing. First, we will
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focus on generating profiles for network configurations where the source is not
located in the corner but rather at other locations in the network. We conjecture
that specific protocols may have to be developed when the source is located
elsewhere than the corner. Secondly, we will consider other protocols, such as
OLSR [44], for protectionless routing to provide a baseline profile. And finally,
we plan on investigating the suitability of preference learning [45] for selecting
appropriate values for aspiration levels.
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